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INTRODUCTION
Many believe that health care is, or should be treated as, a “typical”
economic good.1 As such, its delivery and distribution should be
governed by “standard economic theory,”2 in the context of a “free”3 or
* Associate Dean, Online Learning; Director, Beazley Institute for Health Law and Policy;
Associate Professor of Law. The Author is deeply indebted to Lauren Batterham, J.D. candidate,
Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 2018, for her outstanding research assistance.
1. See STEPHEN MORRIS ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN HEALTH CARE 20 (2007) (describing
health care as an economic good operating within a normative and positive economic market); but
see Clark Havighurst & Barak Richman, Who Pays? Who Benefits? Unfairness in American
Health Care, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 493, 511 (2011) (noting that the
electorate does not realize that health care is an economic good because the government does not
present it with the requisite information to make informed decisions).
2. Standard economic theory is a normative theory that proposes that humans have the ability
to consistently make rational decisions based on what they believe to be their current situation, and
the markets and institutions that will regulate them. Efficiency under this model relies on the advent
of complete markets (i.e., perfect information on the parts of consumers and price-taking behavior
on behalf of producers). Dan Ariely, The End of Rational Economics, HARV. BUS. REV. (2009),
https://hbr.org/2009/07/the-end-of-rational-economics; see Grant Hayden & Stephen Ellis, Law
and Economics After Behavioral Economics, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 629, 633 (2007) (tracing the
origins of the standard economic theory).
3. Under traditional economic theory, resources are exchanged within a free market system,
which includes the characteristics of private property, freedom of choice, motivation of selfinterest, competition, and limited government interference. Sangeeta Agarwal, 5 Essential
Features of Capitalism or Free Market Economy, PRESERVE ARTICLES (2012),
http://www.preservearticles.com/201105056260/features-of-capitalist-or-free-market-
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“competitive”4 market. While each of these terms means something
different, all of the terms share one characteristic: the primacy of
consumers having “complete” or “perfect” knowledge of the good being
sold.5 This knowledge is related to the “value” of the good—its price and
quality—so that consumers can make informed choices.6
Even a cursory review of the attributes of the health care market,
however, raises serious questions as to whether consumers have, or can
ever have, the knowledge necessary for a competitive market to work in
health care.7 Medical care is complicated, and insurance policies are
dense documents. And because we habitually minimize risks that we
cannot, or would rather not, contemplate,8 in a moment of need and
economy.html. Perfect competition consists of a market structure where there are enough firms
that each have a relatively small market share, while selling identical products and acting
independently so as to not affect the overall market through their production decisions. Perfect
competition also expresses the idea that if people have the freedom of choice, resources will be
allocated appropriately among participants in the market. Kent Greenfield, Choice and the Free
Market, MONTREAL REV. (Jan. 2012), http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/The-Myth-ofChoice-Personal-Responsibility-in-a-World-of-Limits-by-Kent-Greenfield.php.
4. Competitive markets exist where a large number of producers compete in serving many
consumers, and where no individual can control the operation of the market or determine the costs
of goods or services and can only be formed when certain requirements are met. Competitive
markets also depend on the assumption that while people will act in their own self-interest, overall
market efficiency will ultimately be achieved. Simon Willkie, Symposium, Current Regulatory
Realities: Overcoming the Regulatory Quandary, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 599, 599;
Competitive
Markets,
ECON.
ONLINE,
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Competitive_markets/Competitive_markets.html (last visited
Apr. 12, 2017).
5. Perfect or complete knowledge refers to the absence of information failure or delay in the
flow
of
information.
Perfect
Competition,
ECON.
ONLINE,
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Perfect_competition.html (last visited
Apr. 12, 2017); see Richard Sexton, Welfare Loss from Inaccurate Information: An Economic
Model with Application to Food Labels, 15 J. CONSUMER AFF. 214, 216 (1981) (explaining the
effects of the consumer’s lack of perfect and complete information on the demand curve); Dennis
Yao, Beyond the Reach of the Invisible Hand: Impediments to Economic Activity, Market Failures,
and Profitability, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 59, 68 (1988) (noting that consumers who lack perfect
information will make rational decisions based on their experiences in the marketplace).
6. George B. Sproles, Conceptualization and Measurement of Optimal Consumer DecisionMaking, 17 J. CONSUMER AFF. 421, 423 (1983) (noting that a consumer assesses the value of a
product based on the information he or she has at the time of his or her decision).
7. See MORRIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 14–16 (establishing that the health care market is
fundamentally different from other markets because it depends on critical evaluations of economic
theory and empirical analysis to deduce the explicit and implicit normative content of data); Diane
Duffy, Market Model Fails: Linkages Between Health Policy and Performance Outcomes in
Western Industrial Countries, 21 J. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. ADMIN. 278, 300–02 (1999)
(determining that the health care market violates assumptions of a traditional economic system and
therefore should not be amenable to market pressures).
8. DEBORAH LUPTON, RISK 120 (1999) (suggesting that the rational decision maker will avoid
risks on a conscious level when engaging in a cost-benefit analysis); see generally Du Du, General
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vulnerability, the last thing one wants to do is negotiate prices pursuant
to those dense and complicated documents.
Of course, this is not to imply that the current health care market is
working—at best, the market is characterized as a strange mixture of
competition and “command and control” that is lacking in transparency.9
Prices continue to rise;10 consumers still find the individual insurance
market challenging to navigate;11 many individuals still lack highquality, accessible health care services;12 and many common measures of
public health in the United States rival those of third world countries.13
Still, there is a worry that the current movement toward more fully
embracing competition as the means to allocate health care services is
fraught with peril. Wrong choices made by patients acting as consumers
Equilibrium Pricing of Options with Habit Formation and Event Risks, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 400 (2011)
(explaining the impact of habit formation on consumer risk aversion).
9. Bill Clinton recently stated that Obamacare (i.e., the Patent Protection and Affordable Care
Act (“ACA”)) is the “craziest thing” he has ever seen. GOP War Room, Bill Clinton: Obamacare
“Crazy System,” People End Up w/ “Premiums Doubled and Coverage Cut in Half,” YOUTUBE
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VsCg-0GAbt4; but see Sarah Kliff, Bill
Clinton’s Anti-Obamacare Remarks, Explained, VOX (Oct. 4, 2016, 4:10 PM),
http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/10/4/13162654/bill-clinton-obamacare (noting that
Bill Clinton was referring to the health care system as a whole and that small businesses and people
just above the poverty line are disparately impacted by the overall system).
10. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS:
2016
SUMMARY
OF
FINDINGS
1
(2016),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/employer-health-benefits-2016summary-of-findings.pdf (noting increases in health care insurance premiums).
11. David Blumenthal & Sara Collins, Turmoil in Individual Private Health Insurance Markets:
Welcome
to
Real
Competition,
COMMONWEALTH FUND (July
26,
2016),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2016/jul/turmoil-individual-privatemarkets (listing the major issues in individual insurance as financial losses and proposed price
increases by participating insurance companies); David Boddy et al., Emerging Trends and
Enduring Challenges in U.S. Health Care, BROOKINGS (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/health360/2015/10/07/emerging-trends-and-enduringchallenges-in-u-s-health-care/ (noting that consumers often lack relevant information and insurance
literacy when selecting their private insurance).
12. Boddy et al., supra note 11 (noting that the insurance coverage gap in the United States
leaves an estimated 33 million people without insurance); Rachel Garfield & Anthony Damico, The
Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in the United States that Do Not Expand Medicaid, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 19, 2016), http://kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsuredpoor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/ (explaining the consequences of the Supreme
Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius to make the ACA
Medicaid expansion optional for the states, leaving millions of people who have incomes above
Medicaid eligibility, but are unable to qualify for tax subsidies, without access to insurance that is
actually affordable).
13. See David Squires & Chloe Anderson, U.S HEALTH CARE FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE,
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issuebriefs/2015/oct/us-health-care-from-a-global-perspective (documenting that the United States
spends more on health insurance than other countries, but has substandard care and quality).
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lead to delays in accessing services. Even further, some companies may
capitalize on the fact that these patients-consumers make wrong choices
and might not thoroughly consider all options by incentivizing avenues
of care that may be suboptimal with enormous consequences. This Essay
advocates that health care should not be treated like any other good and
that the vagaries of a competitive free market should not be the approach
to achieve health care’s so-called “Triple Aim”: high-quality, low-cost,
accessible health care.14
This Essay’s concerns about the role of competition are further
heightened given the current movement toward “consumer directed”15 or
“defined contribution”16 health care—the idea being that consumers
should be empowered to make cost/benefit choices on their desired (if
any) type of insurance coverage and then fully bear the implications of
those choices. This is very much a competitive market approach, as it
assumes that the industry must empower consumers to make selfinterested choices to improve quality and reduce the cost of health care.
In this defined contribution world, employers will no longer provide
health care insurance to workers,17 but rather will provide a fixed amount
14. The Triple Aim refers to the systemic goal for all residents of the United States to access
quality health care. IHI Triple Aim Initiative, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT,
http://www.ihi.org/engage/initiatives/tripleaim/pages/default.aspx (last visited May 1, 2017); see
Robert McCann, Something Old, Something New: Accounting for Accountable Care in Antitrust
Analysis, in 27 HEALTH L. HANDBOOK 147, 157 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2015) (“The Triple Aim
embodies the premise that improving clinical processes and improving the coordination and
management of care will lead simultaneously to better patient outcomes and lower expenditures.”);
but see Jean Shami, A Promise Realized? A Critical Review of Accountable Care Organizations
Since the Enactment of the Affordable Care Act, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 312, 316 (2016) (commenting
that in relation to Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”) “the ‘Triple Aim’ has been undone
by the disproportionate emphasis on ‘restraining costs’ [and this] financial focus overshadows the
two remaining priorities of American health reform: improving quality of care and facilitating
access to care”).
15. See Consumer-Directed Health Care, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS,
http://www.ncpa.org/about-cdhc/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2016) (defining consumer-directed health
care plans as those that allow patients “to control and manage their own health care dollars, [and]
help individuals become more conscientious consumers of health care”).
16. Healthcare
Solutions:
Defined
Contribution
Plan,
NFIB,
http://www.nfib.com/cribsheets/defined-contributions/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2017) (defining health
care contribution plans as plans where “the employer provides the employee with a fixed quantity
of money [and] the employee [then] uses these funds to purchase a health insurance policy of his
or her own choice”).
17. See PAUL M. HAMBURGER, 1 MANDATED HEALTH BENEFITS: THE COBRA GUIDE ¶ 1216
fig. 1216-A (2016) (listing the five types of defined contribution plans as employee-paid
reimbursable health flexible spending accounts (“FSAs”), reimbursable health FSAs that are a
combination of employer and employee paid, employer-paid health reimbursement arrangements,
health savings accounts, and archer medical savings accounts); Robert Galvin, How Employers Are
Responding to the ACA, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 604, 605 (2016) (noting that employers have turned
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of money that an employee can deposit into a health savings account—
along with the employee’s own money—to pay health care expenses.18
Coupled with a high-deductible health plan, whereby the employee is
required to pay a minimum deductible of $1,300 (individual) and $2,600
(family) for catastrophic health care coverage,19 this “skin in the game”
is designed to interject a degree of value consciousness into health care
purchasing to parallel any other consumer good.20
In considering the impact of this expansion of consumer-directed
health care and its increased cost-sharing obligations, one must realize
that insurance is not just a payment mechanism, but rather the key to
entering the health care marketplace. Health care services are expensive,
and few can afford a long course of treatment without insurance
coverage.21 While private hospitals have a legal obligation to provide
care, this only arises in the context of an emergency or a possible urgent

to consumer-driven and defined contribution health plans as a way to cut costs and fix contributions
based on a benefit design where employees can buy up or buy down their insurance).
18. See Brian Shiker, Defined Contribution Health Plans: HRAs and HSAs, 30 J. PENSION
PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 96, 9798 (2004) (explaining that a health savings account (“HSA”) is an
employer-funded nonforfeitable trust established for an individual employee participating in the
employer’s health care plan with an annual fixed amount per year that the employee can add to if
desired).
19. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUBLICATION 969, HEALTH SAVINGS
ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX FAVORED HEALTH PLANS 3 (2016); see also Out-of-Pocket Maximum
Limits on Health Plans, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/health-insurance/out-ofpocket-maximum/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2017) (noting that minimum deductibles for HSAs will
remain unchanged in 2017).
20. See DAVID M. ADAMSON, RAND CORP., SKIN IN THE GAME: HOW CONSUMER-DIRECTED
PLANS
AFFECT
THE
COST
AND
USE
OF
HEALTH
CARE
1
(2012),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2012/RAND_RB9672.pdf (positing
that consumer-directed plans aim to make consumers responsible for a higher share of the price);
William
Safire,
Skin
in
the
Game,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
17,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/magazine/17wwln_safire.html (quoting Senator Tom Coburn
as saying that HSAs “give consumers some ‘skin in the game’ by putting them in charge of healthcare dollars”); see also Samantha Howe, Public Engagement in Health Policy Formulation:
Contexts, Content & Identity Construction (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State
University), https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=osu1376662937&disposition=inline
(discussing that by having individuals have “skin in the game” in regards to their health care plans
will improve efficiency and quality of care); but see NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, HEALTHY
CHOICES OR BAD MEDICINE?: HEALTH TAX INCENTIVES ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT 36 (2008),
http://publications.nclr.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/41/TranscriptFinal.pdf?sequence=1&isA
llowed=y (noting that the United States has the most “skin in the game” out of any other developing
countries (i.e., the highest ratio of costs borne by consumers)).
21. Timothy Jost, Affordability: The Most Urgent Health Reform Issue for Ordinary Americans,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/02/29/affordability-themost-urgent-health-reform-issue-for-ordinary-americans/ (noting that even though the ACA makes
health insurance more affordable, premiums and cost-sharing plans are still costly).
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condition.22 Private physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and many
other health care providers have no legal obligation to provide services
or products for free or reduced costs. Therefore, one must present an
insurance card within five minutes of visiting a physician. By design,
pulling back the scope and level of coverage will cause patientsconsumers to consider their need for care. While to some extent, benefit
levels and cost sharing have always impacted health care access, the
higher level of cost sharing brings affordability of health care to a point
where patients-consumers cannot access essential services because
patients-consumers are considering the costs of their health care before
the service is rendered.
Not only has defined contribution thinking taken sway amongst private
employers,23 but it appears to be gaining headway in possible Medicare
and Medicaid program reforms. While the views of President Trump’s
administration continue to be unclear,24 House Speaker Paul Ryan calls
for the implementation of Medicare vouchers, which would enable
beneficiaries to shop the private insurance market for the type of coverage
they would prefer.25 And some state Medicaid programs, such as
22. While there is no general duty for private hospitals to provide care, under certain
circumstances, federal statutes require hospitals to provide care to patients. One example is the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), which requires hospitals with
emergency departments participating in the Federal Medicare program to provide medical
screening to any patient seeking emergency care and to provide treatment to unstable patients.
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2003). A
hospital is prohibited from transferring a patient until their condition is stabilized. Id.; see also
BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 5.2 (3d ed. 2014) (providing a general overview of
EMTALA). On the other hand, public hospitals have a duty to provide care to the indigent and
their clientele often consists of Medicare and Medicaid patients. See Brietta Clark, Disentangling
Fact from Fiction: The Realities of Unequal Health Care Treatment, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 1023, 1046 (2005) (noting that while public hospitals have a duty to provide care, private
hospitals do not).
23. This is because of its significant ability to lower employer costs as it caps the employer
contribution typically at a lower level. See AKSHAY KAPUR ET AL., BOOZ & CO., THE EMERGENCE
OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: FUELING THE “CONSUMERIZATION” OF
EMPLOYER-INSPIRED
HEALTH
INSURANCE
2
(2012),
http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/uploads/Strategyand-Emergence-Private-HealthInsurance-Exchanges.pdf (“This model allows the company to cap its healthcare cost at a desired
threshold, improving control of current expenses and future liabilities.”); Katherine Stone, A Fatal
Mismatch: Employer-Centric Benefits in a Boundaryless World, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 451,
451 (2007) (noting that employers prefer defined contribution plans in the face of the aging baby
boomer population).
24. Peter Sullivan, What We Know and Don’t Know About Trump’s Healthcare Plans, HILL
(Jan. 22, 2017, 6:00 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/315387-what-we-know-and-dontknow-about-trumps-healthcare-plans.
25. See Bernie Becker, Ryan Set for Collision Course with Obama, HILL (Nov. 20, 2014, 6:00
AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/224805-ryan-set-for-collision-course-with-obama
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Arkansas,26 implemented a version of Medicaid vouchers in addition to
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) approving
similar programs in Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.27 Given
the significant cost savings associated with a defined contribution
approach, the idea is likely to gain even further sway.28
This Essay argues that overall reliance on competition and free market
thinking (particularly value-incentivized consumers) to achieve an
appropriate, fair allocation of health care services will cause significant
harm to many people. In arguing this proposition, this Essay focuses
specifically on the lack of transparency in health care; this lack of
transparency means that the sine qua non of a free market—educated,
self-interested consumers—is lacking.
This Essay also contends that the free market approach will not work
because it ignores the reality that invariably society will intercede to
“rescue” individuals who made poor choices regarding their scope of
insurance coverage, ultimately increasing the cost of every other patientconsumer’s health care services.29 Finally, reliance on this approach
(noting that the Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan, “has proposed sweeping overhauls of entitlement
programs, including partially privatizing Medicare through a premium support plan”); see also
Susan A. Channick, Taming the Beast of Health Care Costs: Why Medicare Reform Alone Is Not
Enough, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 63, 71–72 (2012) (noting that under Speaker Ryan’s “path to
prosperity,” “the federal government would provide beneficiaries a subsidy toward the purchase of
a private health insurance plan through the states’ Health Insurance Exchange [and] any costs in
excess of the premium support would be the responsibility of the beneficiary”).
26. Waiver Services, ARK. DEP’T HUM. SERVS. (last visited May 1, 2017),
http://humanservices.arkansas.gov/ddds/Pages/waiverServices.aspx; see Medicaid Expansion in
Arkansas, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2015), http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/medicaidexpansion-in-arkansas/ (providing an overview of the Arkansas Medicaid waiver program); but cf.
Privatization: Not Right for Medicaid, Not Right for Medicare, CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOC.,
http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/privatization-not-right-for-medicaid-not-right-for-medicare/
(last visited May 1, 2017) (arguing that “a move to managed care could disrupt long-standing
relationships between patients and their doctors, all in the name of quick savings”).
27. An additional twenty-nine states are considering similar avenues. Medicaid Expansion in
Arkansas, supra note 26 (listing various states that have followed a similar path as Arkansas in
regards to Medicaid waiver and voucher programs); Status of State Action on the Medicaid
Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/stateactivity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/?currentTimeframe=0
(last
visited Jan. 3, 2017) (providing data on state action on Medicaid expansion as of January 1, 2017).
28. See, e.g., BRITTON D. WEIMER ET AL., 22 MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES, INSURANCE LAW
& PRACTICE § 11.23 (2016) (explaining that defined contribution health plans lower an employer’s
responsibility to its employees); but see generally Laura Cohn & Phoebe Eliopoulos, What Comes
After Managed Care?, 3704 BUS. WK. 149 (2000) (arguing that defined contribution health plans
shift too many costs from employers to employees).
29. The public absorbs costs through the vehicles of charity care and cost-shifting. See Teresa
Coughlin et al., Uncompensated Care for the Uninsured in 2013: A Detailed Explanation, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (May 30, 2014), http://kff.org/uninsured/report/uncompensated-care-for-the-
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serves to further erode the social compact where everyone should be
entitled to the basic building blocks of life to make their way in the
world.30
I. HEALTH CARE LACKS TRANSPARENCY
The health care industry is not transparent with respect to price or
quality,31 and its primary beneficiary—the patient—often lacks the
capability and capacity to make informed choices.32 Because an
informed consumer able to make value judgments is lacking, the very
foundation necessary for a competitive market to work is absent, causing
the market to fail.
The lack of transparency regarding the quality and price of health care

uninsured-in-2013-a-detailed-examination/ (“While providers incur significant costs in caring for
the uninsured, the bulk of their costs (about two-thirds) are compensated through a web of complex
funding streams that are financed largely with public dollars.”); Abdulrahman El-Sayed, Five
Reasons Free Markets Don’t Work in Health Care, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/abdulrahman-m-elsayed/health-care-market_b_1405396.html
(noting that a free market will not work for health care because consumers’ bad choices will
ultimately lead to more disease and more costs for all); see, e.g., Jason Hart, “Under-Compensated
Care Will Become a Larger Issue in the Long-Term” for Carolina Hospitals, WATCHDOG.ORG
(Mar. 10, 2016), http://watchdog.org/259153/compensated-care-will-become-larger-issue-longterm-carolina-hospitals/ (determining that Medicaid expansion will result in an increased
percentage of charity care costs).
30. AMIR PAZ-FUCHS, THE FOUND. FOR LAW, JUSTICE, & SOC’Y, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
REVISITED:
THE
MODERN
WELFARE
STATE
14–15
(2011),
http://www.fljs.org/files/publications/Paz-Fuchs-SummaryReport.pdf (positing that the social
contract is broken in the health care system).
31. Austin Frakt, Price Transparency Is Nice. Just Don’t Expect It to Cut Health Costs., N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/upshot/price-transparency-is-nicejust-dont-expect-it-to-cut-health-costs.html (noting that a lack of price transparency results in
increased consumer costs); see Kevin Volpp, Price Transparency: Not a Panacea for High Health
Care Costs, 315 JAMA 1842, 1842 (2016) (noting that price transparency tools are counterintuitive
because consumers do not have the relevant information on quality and alternative options when
utilizing them); but see FURROW ET AL., supra note 22, § 7.8 (noting that available options and
information should lead to reduced costs in health care for consumers).
32. See DALE SHALLER, CONSUMERS IN HEALTH CARE: THE BURDEN OF CHOICE 6 (Oct.
2005),
http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/PDF%20C/PDF%20Consum
ersInHealthCareBurdenChoice.pdf (noting that consumers often lack comprehensive data on health
care options which results in an inability to make educated decisions); Joel White, Promoting
Transparence and Clear Choices in Health Care, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 9, 2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/06/09/promoting-transparency-and-clear-choices-in-health-care/
(“Consumers have less information on health provider cost and quality than they do on the cost
and quality of televisions or hotel services.”); see, e.g., Reed Abelson, Hospital Choice May Be
a Matter of Life or Death, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2016, at B5 (positing that when making important
choices (e.g., which hospital to go to), patients lack necessary information (e.g., which hospital has
a higher survival rates for a particular procedure)).
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services has been long known and lamented.33 And there is a legitimate
concern that this lack of transparency will create severely detrimental
consequences in the new world of limited health insurance.34 The nature
of health insurance is changing: health plans are minimizing coverage
and consumers can expect to bear more of the cost of care and to
comparison shop cost and quality to a degree never expected. Invariably,
these burdens will result in choices to delay care or seek less competitive,
lower-quality options, causing harm.35
The lack of transparency in large part results from health insurance
historically shielding beneficiaries from the full cost of care. 36 Thus,
unlike other types of common insurance where coverage is purchased for
catastrophic events and rarely used, health insurance has traditionally
been designed for the patient-consumer to pay for low-risk, oftenencountered occurrences. While society may not agree that everyone has
a right to health care,37 insured individuals seem to agree that this right
33. See HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, PRICE TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH CARE: REPORT
HFMA PRICE TRANSPARENCY TASK FORCE 4 (2014) (noting that price transparency
has been a long-term issue in health care).
34. The percentage of individuals enrolled in high-deductible plans has increased from 20–43
percent in the past five years. Donna Rosato, The Downside of High Deductible Health Insurance,
CONSUMER REP. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.consumerreports.org/health-insurance/downside-ofhigh-deductible-health-insurance/; see AHIP CENTER. FOR RES. & POL’Y, 2015 CENSUS OF
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNT—HIGH DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS 4 (Nov. 2015),
https://www.ahip.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/HSA_Report.pdf (noting an increase of six
million enrollees in HSAs and high-deductible health plans).
35. See Lisa Rosenbaum, The Problem with Knowing How Much Your Health Insurance Costs,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-problem-withknowing-how-much-your-health-care-costs (discussing consumer delay tactics in seeking care);
Tina Rosenberg, The Cure for the $1000 Toothbrush, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2013, 10:08 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/the-cure-for-the-1000-toothbrush/?_r=0 (noting
how a lack of price transparency may lead to financial ruin).
36. See John Santa, Transparency in the Cost of Care, in THE HEALTHCARE IMPERATIVE:
LOWERING COSTS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES: WORKSHOP SERIES SUMMARY 337, 337–38
(Pierre L. Young & LeighAnne Olson eds., 2010) (“Shielded in the past by comprehensive public
or private insurance coverage, consumers are faced with substantial increases in cost sharing.”);
see, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, State Law Health Care Initiatives, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 87, 88 (2006)
(“The idea is insurance shields consumers from actual health care costs and leads them to demand
more services than they would if they were paying directly for the services with after-tax dollars.”).
37. See Stefan Bernard Baumrin, Why There is No Right to Health Care, in MEDICINE AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS ON DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH CARE 91, 91–95 (Rosamond Rhodes et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2012) (utilizing Kantian deontology to determine that while it may seem that health
care ought to be a right does not necessarily mean that it can practically be a right); but see Andrea
Christopher & Dominic Caruso, Promoting Health as a Human Right in the Post-ACA United
States, 17 AM. MED. ASS’N J. MED. ETHICS 958, 958–59 (2015) (discussing that while society
generally believes that the disadvantaged should be cared for, difficulty accompanies the reference
to health care as a fundamental right because it is a positive right and the United States largely
recognizes negative rights over positive rights); c.f. Lance Gable, The Patient Protection and
FROM THE
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exists, because once coverage is secured, they often immediately seek
health care services.38 Indeed, while an important part of the difficulty
in pricing insurance products on the exchanges is the lack of younger,
healthier individuals opting into the market,39 another significant factor
is the higher-than-expected utilization of services as newly covered
individuals seek (presumably delayed) medical care.40
Government and private insurers have largely focused their efforts on
cost containment, giving much shorter shrift to quality. 41 The Institute
Affordable Care Act, Public Health, and the Elusive Target of Human Rights, 39 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 340, 340 (2011) (noting that though the ACA does not establish a right to health care, “it
does set in motion a number of significant structural and normative changes to [United States] law
that comport with the attainment of the right to health”).
38. Puneet Sandhu, A Legal Right to Health Care: What the United States Can Learn from
Foreign Models of Health Rights Jurisprudence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (2007) (noting that
though the government has failed to guarantee universal access to health care, Americans believe
that health care access should not be limited to individuals who can afford it); but see generally
Amy Anderson, The Impact of the Affordable Care Act on the Health Care Work Force, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/BG2887.pdf (noting the
disparate impact that the influx of Americans with recently acquired health insurance will have on
the medical workforce and how this trend will increase overall health care costs because these
individuals will seek care for conditions that might have been treated more easily and less
expensively, but for the delay due to the lack of health insurance).
39. For a description of the penalty provided by the ACA for not purchasing health insurance,
see Maintenance of Minimum Essential Coverage and Liability for the Shared Responsibility
Payment, 26 C.F.R. § 1.5000A-1 (2014). See also JENNIFER TOLBERT, KAISER FAM. FOUND., THE
COVERAGE PROVISIONS IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: AN UPDATE 28 (2015) (explaining that
the penalty was meant to deter young, healthy individuals from not purchasing insurance). The
enrollment of younger individuals in the health insurance exchanges was meant to prevent an
insurance “death spiral” in the ACA, and it is debatable whether this was successful. Compare
Topher Spiro, The ACA Isn’t in a ‘Death Spiral’—It’s Undergoing a Correction, WASH. POST
(Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/07/the-aca-isnt-ina-death-spiral-its-undergoing-a-correction/?utm_term=.51636dcedb78 (insisting that the market
will stabilize after the November 2016 increase in insurance premiums), with John Goodman,
Obamacare’s Ugly Death Spirals, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2016, 9:53 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoodman/2016/08/26/obamacares-ugly-deathspirals/#11e4d75b48f8 (arguing that Obamacare will cause a downward spiral in quality due to
scarce resources which will result in an upward spiral in price).
40. See, e.g., Stacey McMorrow & Daniel Polsky, Insurance Coverage and Access to Care
Under the Affordable Care Act, PENN. LEONARD DAVIS INST. HEALTH ECON. (Dec. 8, 2016),
http://ldi.upenn.edu/brief/insurance-coverage-and-access-care-under-affordable-care-act (noting
that Medicaid enrollees have an increased difficulty making appointments with their providers due
to an influx of newly insured patients and the reduced numbers of provider participation in
Medicaid); but see J. Michael McWilliams, Health Consequences of Uninsurance Among Adults
in the United States: Recent Evidence and Implications, 87 MILBANK Q. 443, 486 (2009)
(suggesting that “[n]ewly insured adults’ greater demand for health care may lead to more timely
initiation of care, greater use of effective services, or better adherence to recommended
treatments”).
41. Christopher Smith, Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Physicians and the Clash of Liability
Standards and Cost Cutting Goals Within Accountable Care Organizations, 20 ANNALS HEALTH
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of Medicine’s 2000 report, To Err Is Human,42 sounded a clarion call on
the poor quality of health care services—likening the number of deaths
caused by provider error to a daily crashing of a Boeing 747.43 Sixteen
years later, however, it is fair to say that quality initiatives are still at a
fairly basic level of development and implementation. 44 Consumers are
traditionally shielded from cost and have focused little on quality.
Because of this shielding, there is little consumer demand for tools to
assist consumers’ assessment of quality providers.45
L. 165, 165–66 (2011) (noting that the health care reform movement is heavily focused on cost
containment, evidenced by managed care organizations, pay-for performance programs, and
consumer-driven health plans); but see Neelam Sekhri, Managed Care: The US Experience, 78
BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 830, 838 (2000) (saying that care through health maintenance
organizations (“HMOs”) is on equal footing with traditional fee-for-service settings). The industry
sees ACOs as a potential solution to the cost versus quality conundrum, with the intent of rewarding
the ACO-participants for cost containment and quality. Timothy C. Gutwald, Bending the Health
Cost Curve, 90 MICH. B.J. 20, 22 (June 2011) (explaining that ACO participants receive a shared
savings bonus if they meet specified quality standards and cost-savings goals, but if the goals are
not met, the ACO member will lose the bonus and potentially suffer a reduction in payments); see
also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, HEALTH COST CONTAINMENT AND
EFFICIENCIES:
NCSL
BRIEFS
FOR
STATE
LEGISLATORS
55
(2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/IntroandBriefsCC-16.pdf (clarifying that ACOs are not
cost-containment strategies, but are meant to “implement[] comprehensive payment reform and
health care system redesign in order to control the growth in health care costs and obtain better
value for each health care dollar”).
42. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A BETTER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda Kohn et
al. eds., 2000), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK225182/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK225182.pdf
[hereinafter TO ERR IS HUMAN]; see also Cost Containment and Quality Improvement Prioritized
by
the
States,
ST.
COVERAGE
INITIATIVES,
http://www.statecoverage.org/node/1349.html#_ednref4 (last visited Apr. 13, 2017) (“The seminal
1999 Institute of Medicine report, To Err Is Human, shone a light on the pervasiveness of medical
errors in the U.S. health care system, estimating 98,000 deaths per year attributable to medical
errors.”); HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK § 11:2 (Alice G. Gosfield ed. 2009) (“[To Err Is Human]
estimated that the total costs of these medical errors in the form of lost productivity, disability, and
costs for health care were between $17 and $29 billion.”).
43. TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 42, at 55 (distinguishing active errors as “the pilot who
crashed the plane” from latent errors which are “previously undiscovered design malfunctions
causing the plane to roll unexpectedly in a way the pilot could not control and the plane crashed”).
44. See Lucian L. Leape & Karen Davis, To Err Is Human; To Fail to Improve Is
Unconscionable,
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
(Aug.
15,
2005),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/from-the-president/2005/to-err-is-human--tofail-to-improve-is-unconscionable (noting that the medical community has only made progress in
reducing errors, but has not come as far as they should have since the publishing of To Err Is
Human); To Err Is Human: 15 Years Later, WEST HEALTH (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.westhealth.org/to-err-is-human-15-years-later/ (“Though many organizations are
working toward a culture of safety, and have built quality and safety systems, we are still far short
of six sigma care.”); see also JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS.,
ACCREDITATION ISSUES FOR RISK MANAGERS 3 (2004) (tracing the origins of the quality
improvement movement from the 1990s).
45. See CONSUMER REPORTS, CONSUMER-FACING HEALTHCARE COST AND QUALITY TOOLS
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Widespread disparities relating to price and quality, seemingly
unhinged from outcomes, are rampant.46 For many years, the Dartmouth
Atlas highlighted significant treatment differences in a wide variety of
health care procedures, including tonsillectomies, coronary, stents, and
hip fractures—all with no discernable link to quality.47 Researchers long
ago concluded that physician training and practice patterns were
responsible for care variation, and that if the nation adopted best
practices, then savings associated with standardized approaches would be
3 (Nov. 2016), http://nyshealthfoundation.org/uploads/resources/consumer-facing-health-carecost-quality-tools-consumer-reports-brief.pdf (“Overall usage and awareness of cost-estimator
tools is low, despite high consumer interest in healthcare costs.”); THE HASTINGS CTR., HEALTH
CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT: ETHICAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 135 (Bruce Jennings et al.
eds.,
2007),
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Health-Care-QualityImprovement.pdf (noting that “even when [consumers] are provided with applicable quality data,
consumers continue to rely on personal recommendations of their physicians, family, and friends”);
KATY HENRICKSON ET AL., HEALTH CARE COST COMPARISON TOOLS: A MARKET UNDER
CONSTRUCTION 4 (June 2006) (noting that while tools are available to consumers, the tools tend to
be educational rather than comparison oriented); see also John Santilli & Randy Vogenberg, Key
Strategic Trends that Impact Healthcare Decision-Making and Stakeholder Roles in the New
Marketplace, 8 AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 15, 18 (2015) (establishing that younger
consumers and new-age wellness providers are more likely to use quality assessment tools than
past generations).
46. See ELLIOT FISHER ET AL., DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY & CLINICAL
PRACTICE, HEALTH CARE SPENDING, QUALITY, AND OUTCOMES: MORE ISN’T ALWAYS BETTER
1 (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Spending_Brief_022709.pdf
(discussing the relationship between regional differences of spending and quality in health care);
see also Jonathan Skinner & Amitabh Chandra, The Elusive Connection Between Health Care
Spending and Quality, 28 HEALTH AFF. 119, 122 (2009) (“[I]mproving health care quality is not a
matter of simply adding more specialists or hospital beds; it is far more challenging and requires
grappling with barriers to improving productivity in health care services—better quality at lower
cost.”). Beyond disparities in treatments due to medical training and community standards, racial
and ethnic disparities have a significant impact on the disparate healthcare provided in America.
See Samantha Artiga, Disparities in Health and Health Care: Questions and Answers, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 12, 2016), http://kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/disparities-in-healthand-health-care-five-key-questions-and-answers/ (defining health care disparities as the
“differences between groups in health insurance coverage, access to and use of care, and quality of
care”); cf. Omar K. Danner et al., Healthcare Outcome Disparities in Trauma Care, 13 WESTERN
J. EMERGENCY MED. 217, 219 (2012) (providing that “improving cultural competency, addressing
health literacy, and implementing quality-of-care improvement initiatives focused on equity and
educating the public may reduce disparities in healthcare”); Peter Franks & Kevin Fiscella,
Reducing Disparities Downstream: Prospects and Challenges, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 672,
672–73 (2008) (proposing that health care is a social good and that disparities in health care indicate
a deficit in quality of care that is not inevitable).
47. JOHN E. WENNBERG & MEGAN MCANDREW COOPER, DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH
CARE
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
2
(1996),
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/atlases/96Atlas.pdf; see CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE
CLINICAL
SCIS.,
PREFERENCE
SENSITIVE
CARE
2
(2007),
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/preference_sensitive.pdf (noting multiple
differences in treatment options).
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immense.48
Serious efforts at the federal, state, and private levels are underway to
provide consumers with quality and price information to enable
intelligent choices. For example, on a federal level, CMS’ Quality
Initiative provides consumers with quality-of-care information and
provides the Hospital Compare49 online platform for consumers to
research hospital quality, patient satisfaction, and pricing. 50 In addition,
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) allotted $250
million in state funds for the improvement of price transparency and
requires CMS to make standardized extracts of Medicare claims available
for provider evaluation.51 States (e.g., Massachusetts and New
Hampshire)52 have also led the charge to provide information to
consumers.53 Massachusetts pioneered with its October 2013 legislation,
which required insurers, physicians, and hospitals to provide health care
consumers with the costs of health care procedures ranging from office
visits at a primary care provider’s office to surgical procedures.54 In
48. WENNBERG & COOPER, supra note 47, at 6. See ANITA ARORA & ALICIA TRUE, WHAT
KIND OF PHYSICIAN WILL YOU BE?: VARIATION IN HEALTH CARE AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR
RESIDENCY
TRAINING
3
(2012)
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Residency_report_103012.pdf (explaining that
institutional treatment practice variations cause variations in physician training).
49. Hospital
Compare,
MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/search.html? (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
50. Julia Hudson, Have Your Cake and Eat It, Too: How States Could Leverage Data on Quality
to Promote Health Care Transparency & Patient Privacy Within Consumer-Driven Health Care
Initiatives, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 663, 669 (2013) (explaining the Medicaid Quality initiative).
51. Medicare Program: Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement, 76 Fed.
Reg. 76,541 (Dec. 7, 2011); see FAMILIES USA, PRICE TRANSPARENCY: AN INTRODUCTION 7
(2014),
http://familiesusa.org/sites/default/files/product_documents/HSI%20Price%20Transparancy%20
Brief_final_web.pdf (providing data on ACA funding); Hudson, supra note 50, at 670 (commenting
on Medicare provisions of the ACA).
52. See FAMILIES USA, supra note 51, at 8–9; see also Anna Sinaiko & Meredith Rosenthal,
Increased Price Transparency in Health Care—Challenges and Potential Effects, 364 NEW. ENGL.
J. OF MED. 891, 891 (2011).
53. See FAMILIES USA, supra note 51, at 8 (noting that states are influential, but warning that
their practices vary significantly); Martha Hostetter & Sarah Klein, Health Care Price
Transparency: Can It Promote High-Value Care?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (2012),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletters/quality-matters/2012/april-may/infocus (noting state and federal policies that promote price transparency); see also Sinaiko &
Rosenthal, supra note 52, at 892 (noting that most states’ legislation focuses on “average or median
within-hospital prices for individual services”).
54. See William Hudec, Massachusetts Becomes First State to Post Prices of Health Care
Services, ADVISORY BOARD (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.advisory.com/research/medical-groupstrategy-council/practice-notes/2014/december/mass-price-transparency (providing an overview of
Massachusetts’ health care cost transparency legislation); Liz Kowalczyk, Comparison Shopping
for
Medical
Procedures,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(Dec.
9,
2013),
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2005, New Hampshire passed legislation that created the New Hampshire
Comprehensive Health Care Information System, and mandated the
creation of an all-payor claims data base (“APCD”) and a consumerfriendly public website.55 This information system collects provider data
from a broad array of providers and services, and the New Hampshire
APCD lists total and out-of-pocket costs for consumers.56 Private
insurers have also moved to empower consumers. For example, Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Illinois provides detailed information on
comparisons of in-network versus out-of-network provider services,
ranging from CT scans to preferred brand drugs for certain medical
conditions.57
All of these initiatives are supported by incentivizing consumers to
focus more deeply on the quality and cost of their care through increases
in their out-of-pocket health care expenditures. Even if a consumer
wishes to secure price and quality information, however, their ability to
appropriately interpret this data may be rudimentary at best. 58 And, in
many cases involving elderly, vulnerable, or frail individuals, the
expectation of seeking and interpreting data may be completely
unreasonable.
http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/12/09/new-law-requires-insurersproviders-give-consumers-cost-estimates-for-their-medicalcare/Sxk01bNeqgi0mEU95uMOAM/story.html (explaining that insurers have a forty-eight-hour
deadline to provide consumers with price data after a request is made); see also Kerry Ann Hayon,
What You Need to Know About Price Transparency Regulations, MASS. MED. SOC’Y (Sept., 2015),
http://www.massmed.org/News-and-Publications/Vital-Signs/What-You-Need-to-Know-aboutPrice-Transparency-Regulations/#.WHLLvrYrLBI (giving guidance to providers on how to
comply with Massachusetts’ cost transparency regulations); but see Melanie Evans, Prices Hard to
Come by for Massachusetts Patients Despite Transparency Law, MOD. HEALTHCARE (June 24,
2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150624/NEWS/150629939 (listing the
difficulties that still exist despite the new Massachusetts legislation).
55. See CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, PRICE TRANSPARENCY REPORT FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 13 (2016) [hereinafter PRICE TRANSPARENCY REPORT]
(discussing New Hampshire’s health care reform); Hostetter & Klein, supra note 53 (contrasting
New Hampshire’s health care transparency policies with other states).
56. Health Costs & Quality of Care in New Hampshire, NH HEALTHCOST,
http://nhhealthcost.nh.gov/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2017); see PRICE TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra
note 55 at 13 (discussing provider data collection methods); Hostetter & Klein, supra note 53
(discussing New Hampshire’s all-payor claims data base requirements).
57. BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF ILL., SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COVERAGE: WHAT THIS
PLAN
COVERS
&
WHAT
IT
COSTS
1–2
(2014),
https://www.bcbsil.com/PDF/2014_abbott_ppoplus.pdf; see also What is a PPO?, BLUECROSS
BLUESHIELD
OF
ILL.,
https://www.bcbsil.com/insurance-basics/how-health-insuranceworks/what-is-a-ppo (last visited Apr. 13, 2017) (providing a comparison of participating provider
option (“PPO”) versus HMO plans for consumers).
58. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting consumer illiteracy in the health care
market).
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To date, for example, leading quality indicators used by the federal
government to determine value-based Medicare payments include
percutaneous coronary intervention (“PCI”) received within 120 minutes
of hospital arrival, thrombolytic agent received within thirty minutes of
hospital arrival, and ACE Inhibitor or Angiotensin Receptor Blocker for
Left Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction and Beta Blocker prescribed at
discharge for a heart attack.59 These particular measurements, however,
have very little resonance with consumers desiring to learn the quality
reputation of potential providers whose care they may solicit.60
“Star” ratings, on a one-to-five scale, are more meaningful as they
distill a multiplicity of factors in a consumer-friendly manner.61 But even
these ratings may capture areas of little or no concern to a particular
consumer, or oversimplify issues causing the rating to be misleading.
And, ratings may fail to equalize across patient characteristics, thus
incorrectly identifying providers as substandard, for example, because
59. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OVERVIEW OF SPECIFICATIONS OF MEASURES
DISPLAYED ON HOSPITAL COMPARE AS OF DECEMBER 14, 2006 2–4 (2006),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/HospitalQualityInits/Downloads/HospitalOverviewOfSpecs200512.pdf (providing
quality measures for heart attacks); see also What Are the Value-Based Programs?, CMS.GOV,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/Value-BasedPrograms/Value-Based-Programs.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (providing an explanation of
value-based programs that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) reimburses);
see
generally
QualityNet
News,
QUALITYNET,
https://www.qualitynet.org/dcs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=QnetPublic%2FPage%2FQne
tHomepage&cid=1120143435383 (last visited Apr. 13, 2017) (providing resources for quality
assessment for hospitals, physician offices, ambulatory surgery centers, cancer hospitals, end stage
renal disease facilities, inpatient psychiatric facilities, and quality improvement organizations).
60. See, e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, AHRQ QUALITY
INDICATORS:
INPATIENT
QUALITY
INDICATORS
1–2
(2015),
http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/Downloads/Modules/IQI/V50/IQI_Brochure.pdf (listing
inpatient quality indicators); see also Jill Mathews Yegian et al., Engaged Patients Will Need
Comparative Physician-Level Quality Data and Information About Their Out-of-Pocket Costs, 32
HEALTH AFF. 328, 335 (2013) (noting that further research must be conducted to improve consumer
engagement in health care quality and cost information).
61. To view the consumer five-star evaluation tool, see Plan Quality and Performance Ratings,
MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/find-aplan/(S(1hp4zh45baqbl52pt1blig2m))/results/planresults/planratings/compare-planratings.aspx?PlanType=MAPD&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (last visited Jan. 14, 2017);
see, e.g., Five-Star Quality Rating System, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/provider-enrollment-andcertification/certificationandcomplianc/fsqrs.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (explaining the FiveStar Quality Rating System as applied to nursing homes); The Five-Star Rating System and
Medicare Plan Enrollment, MEDICARE INTERACTIVE, https://www.medicareinteractive.org/getanswers/overview-of-medicare-health-coverage-options/changing-medicare-health-coverage/thefive-star-rating-system-and-medicare-plan-enrollment (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (explaining the
five-star system in relation to Medicare Part-D plans).
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their patient population is sicker and consequently more prone to poorer
outcomes.
In sum, meaningful measures of value are lacking in the health care
arena. Serious questions also arise regarding consumers’ abilities to
correctly interpret the available data so as to make reasonable choices
impacting their access to quality care.
II. THERE IS NO AVAILABLE PROXY HAVING AN INTEREST UNIFIED WITH
CONSUMERS TO EVALUATE QUALITY AND COST DATA
If we grant the notion that consumers may not be able to possess the
knowledge necessary for a free market in health care to function, we
might next look to see if there is an available agent, or proxy, able to fill
this role on consumers’ behalves. Logical agents include the government
(in the case of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries), private insurers, or
employers. And yet, the same tangle of relationships responsible for the
regulatory burden and confusing incentives rife within health care come
to the fore here.62
The government certainly has mixed incentives that may not give
patient interest its deserved primacy. While there are many regulations
focused on care quality, at their root, Medicare and Medicaid are
insurance programs that have a goal of cost containment.63 While higher
62. Examples of this include case-based reimbursement for hospitals and fee-for-service
reimbursement for physician services. See, e.g., Joel Swider, A Dose of Reality: Unintended
Consequences of Penalizing Hospital Readmissions in the PPACA, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 361,
366 (2012) (explaining that case-based reimbursement for hospitals causes perverse incentives that
reward hospitals for shorter lengths of stays and results in hospitals discharging patients early); see
Charles H. Newman & Jillian L. Romaniello, Physician Compensation Models Post ACA: Has
Anything Really Changed?, N.J. LAW. 10, 11 (Apr. 2016) (noting that although the ACA promotes
value-based reimbursement systems, the vast majority of physicians are reimbursed through feefor-service models); Corbin Santo, Walking a Tightrope: Regulating Medicare Fraud and Abuse
and the Transition to Value-Based Payment, 64 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 1377, 1385 (2014)
(noting that fee-for-service models have “dramatic implications” for cost-containment due to the
prescription of unnecessary services by physicians); see also Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D.
Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US Health Care, 307 JAMA 1513, 1514 (2012) (estimating that
fee-for-service payments resulted in an excess of $158–226 billion in 2011 in services that were
not beneficial or unnecessary to patients).
63. Medicaid is specifically affected by cost-containment strategies, because the states take a
variety of perspectives on worthiness and value of expenditures for this population. See Vernon K.
Smith, A National Challenge: How States Try to Control Medicaid Costs and Why It Is So Hard,
in MEDICARE COST CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES IN NORTH CAROLINA AND OTHER STATES 14, 16
(Jenni
Owen
et
al.
eds.,
2005),
https://www.purdue.edu/hhs/hdfs/fii/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/s_ncfis01report.pdf (citing that state funding for Medicaid varies
dramatically state by state, and the federal match rate can vary from 50–77 percent depending on
the state); Maggie Mahar, Why Your State Should Expand Medicaid, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG
(July 29, 2012), https://www.healthinsurance.org/blog/2012/07/29/why-should-you-care-whether-
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expenses, of course, do not necessarily equate with higher quality, neither
are the two concepts divorced. Thus, the potential competing motivators
of cost control and quality enhancement may cause these programs to not
always align with patient interests.64
Private insurers have the exact same issue. The tension between cost
and quality in insurer goals is readily apparent in numerous lawsuits over
many years. These lawsuits challenged the propriety of payment
incentives on physician behavior, where insurers were accused of
corrupting physician judgment by compensation formulas incentivizing
less, and lower-quality, medical care.65 The ACA further highlighted this
tension by limiting the “medical loss ratio”—the portion of the insurance
premium spent on insurer administrative expenses—to 20 percent.66 In
addition, given the high degree of turnover within an insured population,

or-not-your-state-decides-to-expand-medicaid-coverage/ (explaining that what states consider to
be “worthy poor” can vary considerably depending on the state); see also Howard L. Bailit & Cary
Sennett, Utilization Management as a Cost-Containment Strategy, 1991 Supp. HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV. 87, 87 (Mar. 1992) (noting that utilization management strategies are the primary
focus of private and publicly funded health care plans, including Medicare and Medicaid); Michael
E. Porter, Defining and Introducing Value in Health Care, in EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND
THE CHANGING NATURE OF HEALTHCARE: MEETING SUMMARY 161, 161–62 (Mark B. McClellan
et al. eds., 2008), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK52822/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK52822.pdf
(noting that the primary focus of health care actors involve cost containment, rather than patient
value).
64. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting the varying incentives inherent in the
health care industry).
65. Bush v. Dake, No. 86-25767-NM (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 1989) (determining that while
financial incentives do not necessarily violate public policy there may be an issue of fact on whether
they contributed to a physician’s negligence); but see Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 99 Cal.
App. 3d 560, 564–65 (1979) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action with their
allegations that incentive payment plans encouraged physicians to be conservative with prescribing
unnecessary tests because the plaintiffs were not fraudulently led to believe they were receiving the
“best quality” care). Gainsharing may also become an issue in these circumstances, where a
physician, for example, receives a share of savings resulting from her changed practice protocol.
See
Gainsharing,
BUS.
DICTIONARY
(2017),
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/gainsharing.html (defining gainsharing); see also
Nicole Martingano-Reinhart, Gainsharing and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 43
SETON HALL L. REV. 1325, 1325 (2013).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 18051(b) (2010); see SUZANNE KIRCHHOFF, MEDICAL LOSS RATIO
REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA): ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS 5 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42735.pdf (providing the medical loss ratio
(“MLR”) calculation). Indeed, the mere fact that industry parlance termed the percentage of the
premium dollar spent on medical care as a medical loss ratio aptly summarizes the tension between
cost and quality as approached by insurers. See Scott Harrington, Medical Loss Ratio Regulation
Under the Affordable Care Act, 50 INQUIRY 9, 10–11 (2013) (“More attention should be paid to
the underlying tension between the MLR regulations and forward looking efforts to transform the
health care system, including careful consideration of alternatives or modifications to the minimum
MLR approach.”).
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insurance companies take a decidedly short-term perspective on patient
outcomes, often in conflict with a patient’s long-term perspective on their
health.67 And, of course, insurance companies function by carefully
defining, and thereby limiting, the financial risk they assume, so
transferring risk to consumers by definition benefits the insurer.
Finally, for many of the reasons articulated above regarding the
government and insurers, employers too seem conflicted in their
allegiance to access and health care quality.68
Thus, the industry lacks a proxy with a unified interest with consumers.
There is no unbiased, credible party able to make value judgments on
behalf of patients-consumers.
III. RELYING ON THE MARKET TO ALLOCATE HEALTH CARE IS WRONG
As the industry continues to move toward a defined contribution era
where each patient-consumer is expected to conduct one’s own research,
balance cost and quality, and shop around, one must remember that not
all consumers are equipped to manage these new responsibilities. The
ability to access this type of information, process, and make an intelligent
decision requires a level of sophistication that many people simply do not
possess.69 Further, unique aspects of an individual’s medical condition
may render it difficult for patients to properly evaluate competing criteria
in a manner that facilitates free market choice.70
67. See INST. OF MED., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND
PRACTICE
169
(Bernard
Lo
&
Marilyn
J.
Field
eds.,
2009),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK22942/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK22942.pdf (“In general,
payment methods have become more complex as public and private health insurers have offered
incentive payments to physicians related to quality standards, patient satisfaction, and better patient
outcomes.”); Robert Coleman, The Independent Medicare Advisory Committee: Death Panel or
Smart Governing?, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 235, 289 (2010) (“[W]hile the actual
number of uninsured Americans is somewhat constant from year to year, the actual individuals who
are uninsured are rapidly shifting.”); J.S. Hochman, Insurance and Healthcare: An Irresolvable
Conflict of Interest, TEXANS FOR PATIENTS’ & PHYSICIANS’ RTS. (Dec. 11, 2007),
http://www.txppr.org/newsletter.cfm?NewsletterID=58&CategoryID=0 (explaining that the
primary focus of health care is caring for people while the primary focus of insurance is to make
money).
68. See Stakeholder Perspectives on Value, in VALUE IN HEALTH CARE: ACCOUNTING FOR
COST, QUALITY, SAFETY, OUTCOMES, AND INNOVATION 29, 35 (Pierre L. Young et al. eds., 2010),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK50929/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK50929.pdf (noting that
employers may be focused more on saving money than ensuring services are provided to
employees); Robert Mecklenburg, A Better Way for Employers to Procure Health Care, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/a-better-way-for-employers-to-procure-healthcare (pointing out the general weaknesses in employers’ approaches to health care).
69. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting how consumers lack the ability to make
educated decisions in the health care industry).
70. See Peter A Ubel et al., Full Disclosure—Out-of-Pocket Costs as Side Effects, 369 NEW
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Because of the highly personalized nature of health care services, the
influence of procompetitive forces may actually cause harm to a patient.
A patient may gravitate toward an option based on inappropriately
weighing the cost of the service, without sufficiently considering the
likely outcomes from a quality of life perspective.71
Finally, even if one wants to assume that an educated consumer can
make informed choices in a competitive market, the attendant costs
associated with this assumption may be hard to swallow. Externalities
abound in health care, as one’s health status can have a significant impact
on others. Individuals unable to pay for their care may be able to hold
off on certain types of medical care for some time, but this often leads to
very serious, more expensive consequences.72 From both an ethical and
legal perspective, the industry is not going to deny care to individuals
presenting in an emergent situation, even if there is no payor and the cost
is high.73
In the end, however, the nation does not want individuals inflicting the
social cost of their care—public health issues, accidents, and the like—
on society merely because they were unable to make informed health care
choices.74 Even if we adopt a view of “buyer beware”—leading to high
incidences of medical debt—this, too, has significant costs on society. In
the end, delayed care is likely to be provided, but at a cost to society
higher than might have been borne if it had been provided when first
ENG. J. MED. 1484, 1484 (2013) (discussing the lack of physician disclosure to patients before
prescribing treatment); see generally LAURIE KAYE ABRAHAM, MAMA MIGHT BE BETTER OFF
DEAD: THE FAILURE OF HEALTH CARE IN URBAN AMERICA (1994) (discussing the complexity and
difficulties associated with the American health system).
71. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (recognizing the complexity inherent in
health care information and noting how most consumers likely lack the sophistication to decipher
it).
72. See ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 60–77 (discussing how inconsistent primary care can lead
to greater and potential life-threatening costs); Roger Blair & Christine Piette Durrance, Licensing
Health Care Professionals, State Action and Antitrust Policy, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1943, 1951–52
(2015) (“If the prices of preventive health services increase, some patients will be priced out of the
market, which may delay medical care. This may make the consumer worse off if they delay
necessary medical care, which could worsen health care outcomes and lead to more expensive
health care expenditures later.”); Rosenbaum, supra note 35 (discussing consumers’ delay tactics
in pursuing medical care).
73. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing legally required health services, such
as those required through EMTALA).
74. See Terry Barnes, Paying the Price for Affordable Health Risks, ABC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014,
5:08 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-18/barnes-taking-responsibility-for-our-healthchoices/5326254 (arguing that individuals who make uninformed health and injury decisions
should be partially responsible for the cost of their care); see generally Leonard Fleck, Just Caring:
Do the Indolent, the Inebriated, and the Irresponsible Deserve Equal Access to Needed Health
Care?, 11 IND. L. REV. 553 (2014) (debating whether society should inflict the cost of care onto
individuals who have made uneducated decisions regarding their health care).
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needed. It is simply unimaginable that there will be an ethos amongst our
caregivers, health care institutions, and the public that will accept
otherwise.
There certainly is a place in health care for a consumer focus on cost
and quality. An educated consumer is a good thing. We need to be
mindful, however, that we do not attribute to the market a sophistication
that it lacks when it comes to allocating as essential a service as health
care.

